Recently, the SEC faced this issue in three cases where the defendants allegedly hacked into a financial institution's network and traded on the uncovered confidential information. 5 In the ensuing enforcement actions against the hackers, the SEC asserted that such behavior-mere thieves 6 trading on stolen confidential material-violates the SEC's well-known insider trading rule: 10b-5. 7 This Article engages the line of inquiry of whether Rule 10b-5 creates liability for securities trading by mere thieves. ' This Article will discuss the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), emphasizing the most prominent regulation promulgated by the SEC: Rule 10b-5 (the Rule).' Next, the Article will discuss the general fraud and insider trading bases for liability under Rule 10b-5.1 This section will consider the two fundamental theories of insider trading liability: the classical theory," 1 and the misappropriation theory.' 2 The Article will next analyze how mere thieves are liable under Rule 10b-5. 3 This section will particularly focus on recent SEC regulations extending liability under the misappropriation theory beyond the fiduciary sphere and the related case law. Finally, the Article will 7. Complaint, supra note 5, at 10-12; see also Plaintiffs Response, supra note 5, at 9-19 (arguing that trading by mere thieves violates Rule lOb-5). As this Article discusses below, insider trading jurisprudence is virtually all court created because Rule lOb-5 never mentions insider trading. See infra Part II.B.
8. This Article focuses primarily on Department of Justice and SEC enforcement actions. The analysis of this Article also applies to private causes of action, although those cases require plaintiffs to prove slightly different elements. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975) (holding that private causes of action under Rule lOb-5 can be extended only to plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers of securities, and who can therefore more easily establish that they were harmed by the use of information obtained in violation of Rule 10b-5).
9. See infra Part 11. 10. See infra Part IIA-B. The latter source of liability is particularly important because it offers greatly enhanced penalties against defendants.
11. See infra Part II.B. 
10b-5
The basic goals of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193415 are fairness and efficiency in securities transactions. 16 Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
1 7
This section is considered to be a "catchall" provision aimed at fraud in securities trading. 1 " Pursuant to its authority under the Act, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,1 9 which is considered the primary SEC mechanism for regulating securities fraud, including insider trading. 2° The Rule states: provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors, to ensure that securities can be purchased and sold at economically efficient transaction costs, and to provide, to the maximum degree practicable, markets that are open and orderly. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are "not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others. ''22 These broad remedial provisions are designed to address misleading or deceptive practices, regardless of whether they technically satisfy the common law (or statutory) requirements for fraud or deceit. 23 Judge Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that the Act and Rule collectively protect investors by ensuring that purchasers of securities get what they expect and that sellers are not tricked into parting with their securities for a price the purchaser knows is inadequate. 24 Courts recognize two general types of actionable fraud under the Rule and the Act. The first is the equivalent of common-law fraud liability, i.e., simple fraud, which prohibits misrepresentations. 25 The second is insider trading liability, which prohibits individuals from engaging in securities transactions with the benefit of certain information that they uniquely possess. 26 Rule 10b-5 makes no explicit mention of insider trading; the prohibition is purely judicial. 2 7 ground that Congress failed "to legislatively amend th [e] longstanding judicial acceptance of the use of Rule 10b-5" to prosecute insider trading).
21. 
A. Simple Fraud
The Supreme Court has held that "Rule lOb-5 prohibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception."28 Courts apply Rule lOb-5 to securities cases involving simple fraud. 2 9 Accordingly, those generally under no duty to disclose nonpublic information affecting the market price of securities on which they trade (i.e., outsiders) have been subject to Rule 10b-5 liability upon making affirmative misrepresentations related to such securities.
For example, in the class action Liebhard v. Square D Co., defendant Square D Company misrepresented the status of its takeover negotiations and, in doing so, detrimentally affected the interests of plaintiffs, some of whom traded options on the company's securities. 3 ' The Defendant corporation did not owe a fiduciary duty to these options traders, and had no duty to disclose to them takeover negotiations involving the company. 3 " Nonetheless, the court denied the corporation's motion to dismiss, concluding that Rule 10b-5 imposes liability even absent a fiduciary relationship between a defendant and a victim of that defendant's affirmative misrepresentation.
In other words, simple fraud violates Rule lOb-5.
insider trading."); see also O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (explaining how insider trading violates Rule 10b-5 through the application of the judicially created "classical" or "misappropriation" theories).
28. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10 n.7 (citing A.T Brod & Co., 375 F.2d at 397). 29. See, e.g., id. at 10 (applying Rule 10b-5 to a fraudulent sale of securities that left a seller without compensation for the sale of its valuable securities).
30. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that nothing in the law of the Supreme Court "can be construed to require ... a fiduciary relationship between a section 10(b) defendant and the victim of that defendant's affirmative misrepresentation"); Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F. Supp The 1985 Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading expanded on the concept of fairness underlying the application of Rule lOb-5 to insider trading in its report:
[C]ommonsense observations suggest that two of the traditional bases for prohibitions against insider trading are still sound: the "fair play" and "integrity of the markets" arguments. The first relies on the basic policy that cheating is wrong and on the traditional sympathy for the victim of the cheat. The second rests on the oft-repeated argument that people will not entrust their resources to a marketplace they don't believe is fair, any more than a card player will put his chips on the table in a poker game that may be fixed. Szoc"vJ, supra note 16, at 2. While the trading of a single corporate insider may not seem like a very threatening prospect, it has the potential to be magnified as others piggyback off the insider's repeated successful trading. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577-78 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Eventually, some may begin to guess the reason behind the trading, the corporate secret, increasing the risk that the confidential information will be widely disclosed, and the true owner of the information will lose its investment entirely. Id. The existence of this "word of mouth" circulation of material, nonpublic information is demonstrated in stories put out by the media. Theodore C. McCullough, Neither the Act nor the Rule expressly addresses insider trading. Rather, the Rule prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 3 6 The issue in establishing insider trading liability under 10b-5, therefore, was whether regulators and courts could characterize insider trading as fraud or deceit.1 7
The courts, with the SEC's endorsement, addressed this concern by equating a breach of fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty with the fraud requirement of 10b-5." Thus, if an insider intends to trade securities based on confidential information gained through a fiduciary relationship with the information's owner, the insider commits fraud by failing to disclose his trading intentions to the information's owner prior to the trade. 9 Using this linguistic legerdemain of equating the failure to disclose trading intentions with fraud, 4° the courts created insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 and proceeded to expand the Rule's scope. 4 The courts have developed two general theories to guide the application of their judicially created insider trading jurisprudence, 4 2 as A privilege to exploit information improperly obtained would reduce the incentive to invest in legitimate information production by exacerbating free rider problems and by placing on producers the risk of misappropriation. Less information would be produced, because at least some producers would shift resources from additional production to theft of what others had produced. Barry, supra, at 1364. Indeed, even if one admits that permitting insider trading promotes efficient allocation of information, any of the presumed benefits are negligible compared to the harm it has the potential to cause. See RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 629-32 (1984) (stating that because derivatively informed trading is slow to permeate the market and does not always occur, it does not have a significant impact on efficiency). In contrast, the idea that insider trading makes the market more efficient is typically grounded on the efficient market hypothesis, which relies on increasing the distribution of information (whether public or not) to the market. Cox & Fogarty, supra, at 355; Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra, at 110 n.160. Commentators have written extensively on the efficient market hypothesis (in all of its variations). For an in-depth discussion of the efficient market hypothesis, see Barry, supra, at 1330-59. Incidentally, the property rights theory discussed above appeals more to those who focus on principles of efficiency in relation to securities regulation rather than those who focus on fairness. Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra, at 112. There is also a middle ground that would apply the rules of intellectual property to inside information. (1997) . At first glance, the history of Rule 10b-5 seems haphazard, and with good reason: the decision to create the Rule was as much a product of the times as the development of its application has been. Milton Freeman told the story of the birth of the Rule as follows:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end. We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Summer Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened. Stephen, supra note 18, at 284 n. well as the public's perception of it: 4 3 the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. 4 4 Each of these theories of liability is analyzed in seriatim.
The Classical Theory
Under the classical theory of insider trading liability, a person violates Rule lOb-5 by trading on material, nonpublic information because the trade breaches a duty (nominally) owed to the person with whom the insider trades, i.e., the former or future shareholder of the corporation whose stock is the subject of the trade. 4 5 That duty is founded on an employment or other fiduciary relationship that the insider has with the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded. 4 Under [the misappropriation] theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information. The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider's breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate "outsider" in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information. 521 U.S. at 652-53.
45. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52. The shareholder typically is either a former shareholder, if the insider buys securities, or a future shareholder, if the insider sells securities. This oversimplifies reality for the purpose of explication, because the shareholder may choose to sell only a portion of his ownership position or may buy additional shares in a corporation in which he already has an ownership position.
46. 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980 [VOL. 67:570 individuals actually owe fiduciary duties to their employers, 4 8 not to the shareholders of those corporations. 4 9 Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, the relationship between a corporation's employees and its shareholders could be characterized as fiduciary, the Chiarella Court admitted that the shareholders to whom the insider owes this alleged fiduciary duty need not even own shares until after the completion of the insider trading transaction. 5° As such, the relationship creating the insider trading liability cannot be accurately characterized as the alleged fiduciary duty owed by employees to shareholders, because the breach of the fiduciary duty would precede the creation of the fiduciary relationship. More accurately, this theory recognizes that liability derives from a fiduciary obligation that an insider owes the issuer of the security traded, that is, the obligation of an employee to his employer. 5 " Regardless of the theory's true foundation, the classical theory (as the name suggests), narrowly defines insider trading.
The facts of Chiarella help explain the classical theory. In this case, Chiarella, the markup man for a financial printer, obtained confidential information about a corporate takeover by decoding the material given to his employer. 5 2 Chiarella used the information to purchase stock in the target company with which he had no employment or other fiduciary connection.
3
After the takeover was announced, Chiarella then sold the stock at a profit. 4 The government 48 . See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship."); see, e.g., Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that corporate officers "owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporate employer not to (1) actively exploit their positions within the corporation for their own personal benefit, or (2) hinder the ability of a corporation to continue the business for which it was developed") (citations omitted investigated, indicted, and convicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction because, according to the Court, he had no duty to disclose his intention to trade or to abstain from trading on the confidential information because he was neither an explicit insider (employee) nor a fiduciary or quasiinsider (such as an accountant or a lawyer), and did not have any fiduciary relationship with those with whom he traded. 56 Under common law rules, silence constitutes fraud only if the defendant has a duty to disclose, a duty that typically flows from a fiduciary relationship. 57 The Court stated that the Act "cannot be read 'more broadly than its language . . .permit[s]"' and that although Section 10(b) serves as a catchall provision, "what it catches must be fraud.
'5'
The Court, therefore, rejected the broader "parity-of-information" theory, a theory that creates liability when any person trades on information not generally available on the market without first disclosing that information to the public. 59 The Court refused to consider whether [VOL. 67:570 confidential because that theory-the "misappropriation theory"-was not submitted to the jury. 60 Thus, Chiarella could be read to confine insider trading liability to insiders and quasi-insiders. But the Court side-stepped the issue of whether the breach of other relationships of trust could give rise to insider trading violations by refusing to consider the issue for procedural reasons. 6 " Accordingly, under the classical theory, current employees who trade on inside information are covered by Rule 1Ob-5 because they owe a direct duty to their employer not to trade on material, nonpublic information about their employer gained by virtue of their employment. 6 2
The classical theory quickly expanded. In SEC v. Cherif, 63 the Seventh Circuit held that a former employee owes a common law duty to his former employer "to protect any confidential information entrusted to him by his employer during his employment." 6 4 The court, therefore, held that a former employee resembles a current employee in his insider status, and, as such, "is obligated to continue to protect such information after his termination. 65 The Supreme Court further broadened its Chiarella holding in Dirks v. SEC by extending liability to "tippees"-those who receive material, nonpublic information from persons who have a duty to disclose or abstain from trading. 6 6 Dirks, a securities analyst, was told by a former officer of a company that the company engaged in fraudu- The Court reversed Dirks's conviction, however, because the person who tipped him off did not breach a fiduciary duty to the company. 70 The Court further stated that tippers do not breach a fiduciary duty if they did not receive any personal gain from revealing the information.
'
The Court recognized the innocent motives of Dirks and his tipper, and, therefore, found them not liable. The Dirks Court limited the expansion of Rule 10b-5 liability to tippees, continuing to require that the tipper in this context breach a direct fiduciary obligation to the company whose confidential information was the basis for the trade before imposing liability on the tipper or the tippee.
7 3 This maintained the classical theory's insistence on a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship between the company whose security was traded and the insider trader, although the relationship was far more tenuous than the one described in Chiarella. Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly. And for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. Personal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty." Id. at 673-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also argued that Dirks's actions should be considered a violation; otherwise, the result would be "a disservice to this country's attempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets." Id. at 679.
Id. (citations omitted

72.
Id. at 666-67 (majority opinion). This element of the Dirks tipper-tippee liability test, however, seems driven-like much of insider trading jurisprudence-by the specific facts of the case.
73. Id. at 660-61.
74. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (delineating the expansion of the fiduciary duty concept from Chiarella to Dirks).
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The Misappropriation Theory
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella demonstrated support by several members of the Court for the broader "misappropriation theory." Under this theory, insider trading prohibitions are extended to outsiders, or persons unaffiliated with the corporation whose shares are traded. 7 5 Indeed, in their minority opinions, Chief Justice Burger 7 6 and Associate Justices Brennan, 7 7 Blackmun, 7s and Marshall 79 all agreed that a violation of Section 10(b) occurs whenever a person "improperly obtains" and uses material, nonpublic information "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. ' 0 The Chief Justice's dissent in Chiarella supported the idea of an absolute duty to disclose or abstain from trading if a person acquired material, nonpublic information illegally, regardless of the source:
By their terms, these provisions reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme.... Just as surely Congress cannot have intended one standard of fair dealing for "white collar" insiders and another for the "blue collar" level. The very language of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "by repeated use of the word 'any' [was] obviously meant to be inclusive. )). The Chief Justice's dissent outlined a broad, "'fraud on investors' misappropriation theory." Nagy, supra note 3, at 1235. The "fraud on investors" approach was somewhat successful in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the court held that the defendants had violated Rule 10b-5 despite the fact that their sources for the information were neither their employers nor purchasers or sellers of a target company.
82. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts, a broker-dealer was found guilty of violating Rule lOb-5 because he sold a large amount of company stock shortly after finding out about the company's decision to reduce dividends. Id. at 909, 911. He acquired this infor-rule for corporate insiders.
8 3 He asserted that the informational advantage gained by obtaining material information through unlawful means demands consideration of the same factors the SEC considered in Cady, Roberts to determine whether one has a duty to disclose: (1) whether one had access to information that was intended only for a corporate purpose and not a personal benefit; and (2) the inherent unfairness in trading based on information unavailable to others involved in the transaction. 4 The SEC has long argued that the misappropriation theory extends beyond direct business relationships, 8 " and has stated that insiders such as officers, directors, and controlling stockholders "do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is .. .an obligation" to "disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment."
6 Thus, according to Chief Justice Burger, when someone has obtained inside information and wants to exploit it, that person must either disclose the information or abstain from trading in order to avoid liability under the Rule.
7
Justice Blackmun echoed this sentiment in his Chiarella dissent, stating that "[t] he Court has observed that the securities laws were not intended to replicate the law of fiduciary relations. Rather, their purpose is to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets where common law protections have proved inadequate." 8 The minority, therefore, offered support for an inmation from a director of the company before the information had been publicly disclosed. Id. at 909.
83. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice maintained that the majority opinion left open the question of the misappropriation theory's validity because it concluded that the question was not presented to the jury. Id. at 243. Thus, according to the Chief Justice, the Court's actual holding was much narrower than its discussion in the opinion indicated. [VOL. 67:570 sider trading theory essentially based on parity of access to material information." Seven years after Chiarella, the Court evenly divided° over whether to apply the misappropriation theory to a columnist who used information from his not-yet-published column to trade securities featured in his column. 9 In Carpenter v. United States, 9 four Justices held that the defendant-columnist owed a duty to his employer, the source and owner of the information on which he traded, and further stated that the columnist's actions satisfied the "in connection with" requirement even though the victim of the fraud, the employernewspaper, was not a purchaser or seller of securities. 3 In so doing, the Justices asserted that "[t] he Journal had a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the 89. Id. at 252 n.2. The parity of access theory is premised on the idea of "investor expectations regarding the relative accessibility of corporate information to market participants." Painter et al., supra note 16, at 163 n.39. Another commentator remarked that [iun Texas Gulf Sulfur, the SEC argued, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted, the theory that the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act require a parity of information among all traders in the public securities markets. This did not mean that all investors should have precisely the same information; rather, they should all enjoy access to the same information....
[The] parity of information theory was eventually rejected. had not yet filled the seat vacated by Justice Powell. Nagy, supra note 3, at 1238 n.70. IfJustice Powell had still been on the Court, the misappropriation theory likely would have suffered defeat, as Justice Powell had influenced the decision to grant certiorari because he wanted the opportunity to deny the validity of the theory. Id. Interestingly, one commentator has stated that with Justice Powell's retirement, the Court lost the only member who could be labeled a "corporate lawyer," and thus, the Court since then has been criticized for the lack of logic, clarity, and usefulness of its securities law decisions. 91. In this case, R. Foster Winans co-authored the "Heard on the Street" column for the Wall Street Journal, which discussed stocks and provided opinions about the investment potential of each stock. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22. Because the column had an excellent reputation, it could affect the price of the stocks it discussed. Id. The Wall StreetJourna's policy was that the column's content was confidential information until publication; however, Winans entered into a scheme by which he would inform others of the contents of the column before publication so that they could trade based on the potential effect the column would have on the market, and the group would share any profits obtained via this scheme. Id. at 23. The district court found that Winans had misappropriated confidential information and was guilty of a Rule 10b-5 violation, and the court of appeals affirmed. In the meantime, several federal appellate courts, including the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, "adopted the misappropriation theory and applied it in a variety of fact patterns involving both temporary insiders and the use of market information." 9 6 Lower federal courts also applied the theory. 7 But the Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejected it.
9 s As such, many were left wondering how the misappropriation theory would fare in the long run. Many were also confused because the majority opinion in Chiarella seemed "both over-inclusive and under-inclusive[:]" it extended a fiduciary duty to a context in which it was not recognized at common law, yet at the same time ignored the fact that the common law recognizes some duties to disclose that were very similar to the parity of information theory the majority seemed to reject. Donald C. The Supreme Court reversed, ' holding that "criminal liability under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory." 104 While Justice Ginsburg's opinion applied a narrower version of the theory than some circuits embraced,°5 the Court held that misappropriators satisfy the deception requirement under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because they "deal in deception" in that they feign fidelity by "pretend[ing] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's information for personal gain."' 0 6 Thus, like in the classical theory, the Court satisfied the fraud requirement of Rule 1Ob-5 by equating it to the breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like obligation, but now allowed this breach to satisfy the fraud requirement regardless of whether the breach related to the shareholders of the security being traded.' 0 7 O'Hagan was a quintessential outsider because he worked for the firm representing the acquirer when he traded options of the target.' 0 8 Therefore, while the Court still vested its decision in a breach of some relation of trust, this breach no longer had to involve a relationship between an insider of a company and its shareholders.' 0 9 In concluding that the misappropriation theory could support a conviction for securities fraud, O'Hagan distinguished Chiarella and Dirks." The Court stated that Chiarella did not resolve the question Under the misappropriation theory, as in the classical theory, the insider trader received the inside information legally and through no breach of trust or relationship. The illegality arises from the fact that the trader used for himself the confidential information belonging to someone else. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 16 (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). That use of the confidential information without informing its owners constitutes the deceptive act required under Rule lOb-5. Id. Therefore, as the First Circuit recently stated, under the Supreme Court's formulation of the misappropriation theory, the misappropriator can avoid liability through the "safe-harbor" of disclosing his intentions to the owner of the information. Similarly, the Court stated that Dirks did not foreclose the application of the misappropriation theory because the case considered tippee liability rather than misappropriator liability under Section 10(b)
This new misappropriation theory extends liability for securities violations beyond classical insiders 1 5 to those who misappropriate material, nonpublic information for use in a securities transaction in violation of some fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty that they owe to a party, regardless of whether that party issues or trades any of the illegally traded stock.' 1 6 In other words, for the first time, the breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship need not be directed at the company whose stock was traded for the breach to satisfy the fraud requirement of Rule 1Ob-5.11 ' The scope of this expansion cannot be underestimated. Conventional wisdom had held that mere thieves cannot be liable for trading on stolen confidential information because they lack a fiduciary relationship to the source of the information and, therefore, do not deceive that source. 
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which there is an element of intentional deception related to the trade, but no fiduciary relationship. 122 Moreover, some scholars argue that there should be a duty to disclose any information obtained via an illegal act 12' regardless of " [w] hether one calls this a misappropriation or not.
1 24 Finally, while some have suggested that these mere thieves do not create a problem worthy of attention, 125 the fact that the SEC recently addressed the issue demonstrates that mere thieves are in fact a serious concern.
In SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann,' 1 26 the SEC sued Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann (LHV), an Estonian investment company, and two LI-V employees, alleging that the defendants hacked into a website and stole investment-related press releases before they were publicly disseminated. 12 7 The defendants then allegedly traded on the stolen information. 28 One defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the SEC failed to allege sufficient facts for a fraud viola- 123. See Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 109 (asserting that the misappropriation theory is too narrow to prevent trading on information obtained by illicit means); Nagy, supra note 3, at 1252 (arguing that the misappropriation theory as adopted in O'Hagan is much too narrow to accommodate more sophisticated cases, including those involving mere thieves). Some have gone even further and argued that although Rule 10b-5 could be read as protecting only those who can be classified as investors, it has been "stretched" to cover other persons. Thomas Lee Hazen & David L. Ramer, The Jurisprudence of SEC Rule 10b-5, http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_files/thumbs/rtf/35HazenlOb-5CGOOthumb.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). This argument suggests not only that the fraud on investors approach applies, but also that the protection of those traditionally thought to be protected under the Rule (the sources of the information) are actually extensions of the Rule rather than the basis for the Rule.
124. LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, § 6.14. In connection with more than 360 confidential press releases issued by more than 200 U.S. public companies, defendants LHV, Peek, and Lepik, through a series of fraudulent acts, repeatedly have electronically stolen material non-public information from a secure website for the purpose of executing hundreds of securities trades based on that information, successfully making at least $7.8 million in the process. Id. The SEC was alerted to the scheme when several accounts experienced higher than normal trading prior to a particular merger. Id. at 4. In short, if the release contained positive information, then the defendants would purchase the security or call option; if the [VOL. 67:570 MERE TIEVES tion under Section 10(b) or an insider trading violation under Rule 10b-5. " 2 ' This case provided the first opportunity for the court to apply Rule 10b-5 liability to mere thieves. The court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of liability, but did not issue a final disposition because the defendants settled without admitting or denying liability. 130 Thereafter, in SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., 3 1 the Southern District of New York again faced the issue of whether stealing/hacking and trading amounts to a violation of Rule 10b-5. Again, the court issued a preliminary injunction initially supporting liability for mere thieves. The case concluded with a verdict of liability under 10b-5, but was decided by default judgment without opinion. Finally, just a few months ago, in SEC v. Dorozhko, the Southern District of New York confronted this issue for a third time.
See
1 3 4 In Dorozhko, a Ukranian man allegedly hacked into a computer system of a NYSE-listed company's investor relations firm, stole confidential information, and traded on it." 3 5 This time, however, the trial court held that stealing/hacking and trading does not violate Rule 10b-5-distinguishing the district's prior two inchoate cases. 1 36
The remainder of this Article presents a jurisprudential analysis demonstrating that "mere thieves" violate Rule 10b-5 when they trade on stolen, confidential financial information, whether viewed as simple fraud or insider trading.
Moreover, good policy supports this growing course of case law. Applying 10b-5 liability to mere thieves promotes consistency because thieves cannot avoid criminal liability for trading on stolen, nonpublic information.
1 3 7 Full application of Rule 10b-5 to mere thieves propinformation was negative, then they would effectuate a short sale of the security or buy a put option. Id. at 10-11. 1 3 8 this conclusion seems misguided. The distinction should not benefit thieves because, whereas a person with a fiduciary interest obtains information lawfully and uses it unlawfully, a thief both obtains and uses information unlawfully. Therefore, the thief should be punished more, not less, than the person who obtained the information legally. 141. The fact that the federal statute defines hacking as fraud is helpful, but it is not necessary; the SEC has stated that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are "not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others." Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). As such, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were drafted as broad remedial provisions directed toward misleading or deceptive practices, regardless of whether they were technically sufficient to satisfy the common law (or statutory) requirements for fraud or deceit. Id. at 910.
By analogy, if a thief physically breaks into a corporation's headquarters, steals confidential information, and trades on it, Rule lOb-5(a) equally applies.' 4 2 Physical entry, like computer hacking, typically requires deception to access/remove the secret information, as the thief would need to mislead the security (be it human or electronic) protecting the confidential information.' 4 3
While surreptitious thievery is not universally viewed as fraud, it certainly can be. For example, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and most comparable state rules, permit a party to impeach a witness with a prior conviction involving "dishonesty or false statement." ' Courts have been far more willing to broadly interpret the elements of Rule 1Ob-5 than they have been in relaxing the standards for the admission of impeachment evidence. 14 As such, courts would not be dramatically altering the legal landscape of insider trading jurisprudence by including thievery within the rubric of 10b-5 fraud.
B. Insider Trading
In addition to analyzing a simple fraud claim, it is valuable to examine whether mere thieves violate the insider trading prohibition of Rule 10b-5 because insider trading liability gives rise to treble dam- BRIDGE, supra note 142, at 3 (discussing Rule lOb-5 securities fraud liability based upon either "deception" or "manipulation").
144 For years, courts have attempted to address insider trading under Rule lOb-5 on an ad-hoc basis, rarely dealing squarely with corporate theft.' 4 9 As a result, courts have infrequently discussed whether mere thieves of confidential information violate the Rule by trading on stolen, nonpublic material information. This section discusses the language of Rule lOb-5, the policy behind it, and the relevant case law interpreting and developing insider trading jurisprudence in order to demonstrate that mere thieves are liable for insider trading under the Rule.
The classical theory began the complicated topology of insider trading jurisprudence, 15 1 and the landscape expanded with the continually growing misappropriation theory.
15 ' And, while the misappropriation theory has been accepted, the limits of its application remain unclear to courts, commentators, potential victims, and violators.
1 52 The following subsections analyze whether the misappropriation theory still requires a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty and, if not, whether mere thieves violate Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory.
Beyond Fiduciary Relationships
O'Hagan and its progeny should not be read as requiring a fiduciary relationship under the misappropriation theory. 149. The SEC, not surprisingly, has been less reticent in setting forth its position on this issue. See, e.g., Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 n.18 (1971) ("Our formulation would clearly attach responsibility in a situation where the recipient knew or had reason to know the information was obtained by industrial espionage, commercial bribery or the like.").
150. are not only insufficient for Rule lOb-5 liability, they are not even necessary," and that "we must abandon our unwarranted fixation on fiduciary breaches and acknowledge that Rule 10b-5 actually targets deceptions"). Professor Prakash also suggests that despite our fixation on and fascination with insider trading, a large body of case law premises Rule lOb-5 liability on situations not involving material, nonpublic information or breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1536. One commentator has even gone so far as to describe the fiduciary duty .requirement" as "the deus ex machina"-i.e., "the god out of a machine." David Cowan The subsequent development of the misappropriation theory supports Justice Blackmun's view. Under the Second Circuit's pre-O'Hagan version of the misappropriation theory, the Court of Appeals held in United States v. Chestman1 56 that more than a mere familial relationship must be shown to create a 1Ob-5 fiduciary relationship 157 that could be "breached" through the use of confidential information.
158
Three years after O'Hagan, however, the SEC felt emboldened by the Supreme Court's endorsement and promulgated Rule 10b5-2 in response to limitations on the misappropriation theory suggested in Chestman.' 5 9 In Rule 10b5-2, the SEC defined the misappropriation theory to cover three, nonexclusive, specific situations in which a duty exists to keep information confidential. 6°1 55. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 156. 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing the Second Circuit's prior acceptance of the misappropriation theory, but noting that the court would "tread cautiously in extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships").
157. Id. at 568, 570-71. In Chestman, Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling shareholder of the eponymous supermarket, decided to sell his shares to a competing chain for a significant premium. Id at 555. Waldbaum told one relative, who told another, and so on. Each person told the next to keep the information confidential. Id. The penultimate recipient then provided an edited version to his stockbroker, Chestman, who traded on it. Id The Court held that "a person violates Rule lOb-5 when he misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence and uses that information in a securities transaction." Id. at 566. However, as discussed, the court found that the familial relationship alone did not satisfy the relationship test. 
Id.
Further, the rule specifies the following three "duties of trust or confidence," which exist "among others":
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasona-Specifically, Rule 10b5-2 states that if a "person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling," she presumably has a "duty of trust or confidence . .. with respect to the information . ".1.. 61 In addition, the rule specifies that a trust relationship subject to Rule lOb-5 exists whenever someone agrees to keep information in confidence or when parties have a practice of sharing secrets such that the recipient of the confidential information knows or should know that the provider of the information expects confidentiality. 16 2 The SEC stated that the misappropriation theory applies to breaches of these "non-business relationships"' 63 even though they are not fiduciary relationships. Indeed, before enacting Rule 10b5-2, the SEC long argued that the misappropriation theory extends beyond direct business relationships; t6 4 the SEC's position did not even envision the necessity of a fiduciary-like relationship.' 6 5 In Cady, Roberts, for example, the SEC asserted that the classes of people obligated to disclose material facts bly should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
161. 17 C. extends beyond corporate officers. 166 The SEC maintained that the obligation exists if two elements are present: (1) "the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone," and (2) "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
1 6 7 According to the SEC, anyone satisfying these elements must either disclose or abstain from trading.
168
In enacting Rule 10b5-2 after O'Hagan, the SEC explicitly stated that this broader definition of confidential relationships better reflects the purpose of the insider trading laws, 169 which includes "protect[ing] investors and the fairness and integrity of the nation's securities markets against improper trading on the basis of inside information."
170
Of course, the SEC's interpretation is not binding law; indeed, the SEC has a vested institutional interest in broad readings of the rules that govern its ability to regulate market participants. 17 1 This bias notwithstanding, courts grant deference to SEC views, even if they do not control.
1 72 And, once adopted by the courts, the SEC's views certainly are law.
Those few courts that addressed Rule 10b5-2 essentially endorsed the evisceration of the fiduciary-duty requirement of the misappropriation theory. The Eleventh Circuit, in SEC v. During negotiations for post-nuptial division of assets, David Yun, the president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc., told his wife, Donna Yun, that the price of Scholastic shares would drop on a certain date, and he told her to keep the information confidential. Id. at 1267. While Donna was discussing this information with her divorce attorney on the telephone in her office, a co-worker entered her office and overheard the information; Donna later discussed the information with that co-worker [VOL. 67:570 2 as support for its interpretation of the misappropriation theory that recognizes a duty to keep information confidential absent any explicit fiduciary duty.' 74 The court held that a husband's reasonable expectation that his wife would keep certain material information confidential created a duty of confidentiality that satisfied the up-until-now fiduciary requirement of the misappropriation theory, even absent an explicit fiduciary duty. 17 5 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's pre-O'Hagan view, 17 6 noting that a rule under which spouses presumptively do not have a duty under the misappropriation theory, "too narrowly defined the circumstances in which a duty of loyalty and confidentiality is created between husband and wife." ' 17 7 That idea was one of the expressly stated catalysts for the adoption of Rule 10b5-2.178 Because the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 after the trading in at a business function. Id. at 1268. The co-worker then traded based on that information. (2004), which concluded that in Yun, the Eleventh Circuit settled two disputed theories of insider trading liability by requiring that, in insider trading misappropriation actions, the SEC prove that the alleged misappropriator actually intended to benefit from the tip. Id. at 1503.
174. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273 n.23. 175. Id. at 1272-74. Specifically, the court stated that "a spouse who trades in breach of a reasonable and legitimate expectation of confidentiality held by the other spouse sufficiently subjects the former to insider trading liability." Id. at 1272-73. The court held that the SEC had provided sufficient evidence that the Yuns had "an agreement of confidentiality and a history or pattern of sharing and keeping of business confidences," that Yun agreed to maintain that confidentiality, and that Yun's husband had a reasonable expectation that Yun would keep the information confidential. Id. at 1273-74.
176. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that marriage alone is not sufficient to create the requisite duty under the misappropriation theory despite one spouse trading in breach of the other spouse's reasonable expectation that the information would be kept confidential).
177. 24, 2000) . Additionally, courts' discussion of Rule 10b5-2 demonstrate that the SEC intended to counteract the decision in Chestman by adopting this rule. The court in Yun quoted the previous language from the SEC's statement about the proposed rule and concluded that the SEC's intention to adopt the dissent's position in Chestman supported its determination that a duty of confidentiality existed between a husband and his wife when the husband had a reasonable expectation that the wife would keep material Yun occurred, it did not apply.
1 79 Thus, the court's expansion of the misappropriation theory beyond explicit fiduciary duties arose independently of the rule, although it was informed by its purpose.
In United States v. Kim, 18° the defendant, a member of the Young Presidents Organization (YPO), l s1 received information from another YPO member about a potential merger." 8 2 The members of the YPO were required to comply with a written "Confidentiality Commitment," which stated that "all information shared by the membership must be held in absolute confidence."' 8 3 The court stated that Rule 10b5-2 would have applied had it been adopted before the criminal conduct occurred.
1 4 Because the court could not apply Rule 10b5-2, it held, citing Chestman, that the YPO member was not liable under the misappropriation theory.
5
Yun and Kim demonstrate that the SEC's rulemaking authority expanded courts' views of the scope of liability under the misappropriation theory.
18 6 These cases also establish that courts have interpreted The defendant concedes that under the current regulation, which became effective August 24, 2000, the indictment alleges facts amounting to criminal misappropriation. The new regulation defines three non-exclusive circumstances under which "a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of insider trading" for purposes of Rule lOb-5. They are:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences ... or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling .... Both the first and second scenarios would apply to defendant's conduct in this case. The fact that the SEC saw a need to adopt this new rule adds force to the argument that the conduct it covers was not legally proscribed before adoption of the rule. Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
186. The opinion of a Texas district court further demonstrates this by stating that the "determination that the complaint has sufficiently alleged a fiduciary-like relationship to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss is bolstered by the SEC's statements in adopting Rule 10b5-2 . . . [and] [t]hese allegations . . . bring this case within Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)."
[VOL. 67:570 the misappropriation theory as sufficiently broad to impose liability even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Moreover, despite some concern that the SEC overreached its authority in promulgating Rule 10b5-2," 8 7 the courts have ensconced the Rule in the contemporary legal landscape.
Courts and the SEC have emphasized that the Rule is nonexclusive and extends beyond those fiduciaries liable under the misappropriation theory.' l " But, up to that point, courts had still tethered liability to the existence of some duty of trust-however amorphous In SEC v. Rocklage,' 8 9 the defendant, who shared with her brother nonpublic information that she received from her husband, despite her husband's indication that the information should remain confidential, did not even challenge the application of Rule 10b5-2. 9° The First Circuit affirmed' 9 1 the lower court's refusal to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim that the wife utilized a "manipulative or deceptive device that was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 1 92
In its discussion of the misappropriation theory, the Rocklage court explained:
he misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information." Such deceptive trading exploits unfair informational disparities in the securities market; making such trading illegal also comports with the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b).
Finally, our interpretation finds further support in the investor protection purposes of § 10(b). One of the animating purposes of the statute was to "insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." It furthers that purpose if the "in connection with" requirement reaches schemes in which one party deceptively and intentionally obtains material nonpublic information to enable another to trade with an unfair informational advantage.' 9 3
The Rocklage court's emphasis on the broad social purposes of Rule 10b-5's protection of the markets from traders with an "unfair informational advantage" and diminished focus on the specific, albeit often illusory, elements of the misappropriation test set the stage for the subsequent critical part of the court's analysis. Here, Rocklage discussed the "safe harbor" provision of O'Hagan, 9 4 which allowed misappropriators to avoid liability by disclosing the intention to trade to the party from whom the confidential information was acquired. This safe harbor exists under O'Hagan because the Supreme Court defined the deception requirement of Rule lOb-5 as the fiduciary's failure to disclose to the owner of the confidential information his intention to trade on that nonpublic material.l 9 5 Pursuant to O'Hagan, therefore, a trader avoids violating Rule lOb-5 simply by disclosing his trading intentions to the source of the confidential information-even if the source strenuously objects-because no fiduciary obligation is breached. 479-80 (1977) , in which the Court held that more than a mere breach of fiduciary duty is required for a Section 10(b) violation. In that case, however, there was full disclosure of the pertinent facts relating to the transaction. Id. at 474. This can lead to some interesting holdings. See, e.g., Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an insider did not commit securities fraud when he asked a shareholder to sell him shares and told the shareholder that he had information relevant to the sale but would not disclose that information to the shareholder).
196. Painter et al., supra note 16, at 180. Nevertheless, the O'Hagan Court also, and perhaps contradictorily, recognized that its misappropriation theory does not alleviate the problems caused by insider trading because it fails to ameliorate any of the harm to investors when the misappropriator discloses to the source that he or she plans to trade on the material, nonpublic information if the source does not disclose to the market. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659 n.9.
197. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
avoid insider trading liability. 9 ' This fundamentally altered the legal basis for the misappropriation theory in a positive way. 199 As such, Rocklage purged what was left of the fiduciary relationship requirement from the misappropriation test. 2°0 Liability under the misappropriation theory after Rocklage must be premised on something other than the "fraud" of failing to disclose the intention to trade on confidential information gained from a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.
Of course, the Supreme Court can reverse Rocklage, and other circuits can simply ignore the decision. Indeed, as discussed above, one district court recently rejected the idea that a trader can violate Rule lOb-5 by "hacking into a computer network and stealing material nonpublic information. ' 20 ' The court, unaided by the above analysis, held that no federal court has ever held that the theft of material nonpublic information by a corporate outsider and subsequent trading on that information violates § 10(b) ....
To eliminate the fiduciary requirement now would be to undo decades of Supreme Court precedent, and rewrite the law as it has developed. It is beyond the purview of this Court to do SO. 200. The Rocklage court did attempt to distinguish its case from O'Hagan by asserting that the defendant-wife, Mrs. Rocklage, used deception to acquire the confidential financial information from her husband, rather than in the use of information-as was the case in O'Hagan. Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 3, 12. In describing the facts in Rocklage, however, the court articulated no relevant distinction between its case and O'Hagan. The Rocklage court pointed to two factors that qualified the defendant's actions as deceptive acquisition of confidential information: (1) the defendant's agreement to pass on to her brother any confidential information that she obtained from her husband; and (2) that she did not intend to maintain her husband's confidences. Id& at 3. These factors identified by the Rocklage court as relating to the acquisition of confidential information (which appear identical in substance to each other), however, actually relate to the use of the information. trading, the Rocklage view seems the more likely outcome and the correct jurisprudence. After Rocklage, liability under the misappropriation theory, at least in the First Circuit, is premised on the parity-of-access theory alluded to in the Chiarella dissent.
The Misappropriation Theory Reverts Back to Parity of Access
"Conditioning liability on the existence of a fiduciary relationship le[ft] many unexplained gaps in insider trading enforcement [and] ma [de] what remains of the enforcement scheme unpredictable and possibly inconsistent ..... 03 The First Circuit's holding that disclosure would not vitiate liability for trading on inside information under Rule lOb-5 moves misappropriation jurisprudence away from the fiduciary duty relationship test and back to a theory that fills these gaps and provides for more consistent application of the insider trading provisions, i.e., the parity-of-access theory. 204. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 690 n.6 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As far as the market is concerned, a trade based on confidential information is no more 'honest' because some third party may know of it so long as those on the other side of the trade remain in the dark.").
205. Smith, The Critical Resource Theory, supra note 165, at 1420 ("The most baffling intersection between fiduciary theory and insider trading law arises under the 'misappropriation' theory of insider trading."). Indeed, "[t]he [misappropriation] theory has spawned an extraordinary body of cases as well as an even more extraordinary body of hypotheticals appearing in briefs, treatises, and law review articles exploring the extent and nature of the fiduciary relationship necessary to make a corporate outsider guilty of insider trading." Painter et al., supra note 16, at 156. Furthermore, "each court interpreting the theory has envisioned a target of different size and shape, making the misappropriation theory intolerably vague. 1141-47 (1996) (discussing the problems with application of the misappropriation theory and advocating a regulatory solution); Grzebielski, supra note 187, at 467-68 ("[T]he scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission's . . . prohibition priation theory from Chiarella gave some credence to those dissenting Justices' arguments that any time a purchaser or seller of securities gains information via an illegal act, the trader has a duty to disclose or abstain, regardless of the existence of a fiduciary duty.
20
' The essence of this position is the parity-of-access to information theory of liability for insider trading 20 7 that "all investors should have equal access to information that a reasonable investor would consider material to investment decisions, and that any trade in which only one party had an opportunity to learn and did learn such information is inherently unfair." 20 8 This doctrine derives from the "integrity of the market theory, which states [that] investors will be more confident and more likely to participate in the market if they feel confident they can trade without being at an informational disadvantage.
'20 9 As one commentator suggested:
The rules have changed since the Supreme Court rejected the parity-of-[access to] information doctrine in Chiarella and Dirks. If the Securities Exchange Act's true objective is "to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence" as Justice Ginsberg stated in O'Hagan, the courts should replace the fiduciary duty requirement in the fraud-on-the-source approach to the misappropriation theory with the parity-of-[access to] information doctrine and a fraud-on-the-market approach . 210 The First Circuit effectively did this in Rocklage, returning the misappropriation theory to its judicial roots in the Chiarella dissent. Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan, the Fourth Circuit criticized the misappropriation theory being employed by other circuits, such as the Second and Seventh Circuits, forming the basis for the Supreme Court's more modest version of the misappro-priation theory expressed in O'Hagan, 2 1 1 on the ground that the requirement for a breach of a fiduciary duty was illusory. As such, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the misappropriation theory would ultimately have to become some form of a parity-of-access theory for it to remain intellectually viable. 2 12 Justice Blackmun recognized this point twenty-seven years ago in his Chiarella dissent. In Chiarella, he wrote that liability should attach whenever an illegal act yields access to confidential information, and the recipient does not abstain from trading or disclose to the source of the information, regardless of the existence of a fiduciary duty. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Cherif employing a modest variety of the misappropriation theory, 2 1 5 recognized the possibility of even that version applying to mere thieves: 2 16 There has been some suggestion that Rule lOb-5 should apply even to "mere" thieves. See Chiarella, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that any time information is acquired by an illegal act, whether in breach of a fiduciary duty or not, there is a duty to disclose that information to the purchaser or seller with whom the acquirer trades); 216. While the foregoing analysis brings mere thieves under the purview of insider trading liability via the courts' expansion of the misappropriation theory, mere thieves can, perhaps, also be subject to insider trading liability even under the old model of the misappropriation theory-as mere thieves can be viewed as having a fiduciary-like relationship with the owner of the stolen information. Id. at 412 n.6; LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, § 6.14, at n.5. The thief could be viewed as holding the misappropriated information in a constructive trust for the benefit of the owner from which he stole the information. Accordingly, given courts' expansion of the misappropriation theory from a narrow version in O'Hagan to the endorsement of the broader liability in Rule 10b5-2, Rocklage's removal of the fiduciary requirement, and the reinvigoration of the version of the misappropriation theory originally outlined in the Chiarella dissent, one is left with the inescapable conclusion that mere thieves are liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-5. Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information," and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis forjudgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). But, this concern is misplaced, because the theory of liability implicit in this concern is not the parity-of-access to information theory, but the parity-of-information theory. The parity-of-information theory, unlike the parity-of-access to information theory, requires all market participants to have the same information, rather than just the ability to have the same information. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that an obligation to disclose arises when an informational advantage is gained by unlawful means). Of course, the parity-of-information theory, while intuitively appealing, is, upon any reflection, untenable-it would require those who invest resources and ability to better understand the market to share that legally obtained knowledge with all market participants before trading on that information. Such a model of behavior is wholly inconsistent with a capitalist economy because it undermines any incentive (i.e., reward) for effort. " [T] he value to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17.
Some have said that attempting to limit market analysts' use of insider information while still allowing them to make their recommendations is akin to participating in "a fencing match conducted on a tightrope." LANGEVOORT, supra note 122, § 11.2 (quotation omitted). of the prohibition and better define the wrongdoing so as to relieve (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise. (b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of this section if such person shows that:
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such person to purchase or sell any security described in paragraph (a) of this section or to cause any such security to be purchased or sold by or on behalf of others did not know the material, nonpublic information; and (2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate paragraph (a) of this section, which policies and procedures may include, but are not limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information.
(d)(1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful for any person described in paragraph (d) (2) of this section to communicate material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a violation of this section except that this paragraph shall not apply to a communication made in good faith, (i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering person, to its advisors or to other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender offer; (ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by such tender offer, to its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors or to other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities of the issuer with respect to such tender offer; or (iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder.
(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d) (1) of this section are: (i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors; (ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer or its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors; (iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d) (2) (i) of this section or the issuer or persons in paragraph (d) (2) (ii) of this section; and (iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above. [VOL. 67:570 legislation would guarantee the application of Rule 10b-5 to mere thieves, 2 3 7 future legislative action seems unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
Securities markets face a new threat never before seen. Now for the first time thieves can use relatively unsophisticated technology to conduct corporate espionage and, thereafter, trade stock based on their stolen secrets. Indeed, the SEC's recent confrontation with this phenomenon only foreshadows its likely greater incidence in the near future. Unfortunately, the largely court-created securities jurisprudence has failed to address the scope of liability for this growing problem due to its novelty. 2 38 In this Article, I set forth a jurisprudential analysis under which mere thieves who trade on stolen confidential information are liable under Rule lOb-5 pursuant to insider trading doctrine. 2 3 9 This theory is significant for two reasons. The first is purely practical: insider trading liability offers much greater damages than 10b-5 liability for simple fraud. 240 The second is philosophical: the theory laid out in this Article is not only supported by case law, it is sound policy. Full application of Rule lOb-5 to mere thieves would properly order penalties for wrongdoers. The foundational premise of the theory is that the misconduct committed by thieves is more culpable than misconduct committed by traditional insiders, because insiders obtain their information lawfully but use it unlawfully, whereas the thief obtains his instatute, including, for example, those persons who are defined as insiders, enjoying a "special relationship" with the enterprise or having "access" to nonpublic information. Id.; see also Painter et al., supra note 16, at 211-12 (observing that the United States is unique in prohibiting insider trading using a common law approach). The lack of a specific definition has clearly led to confusion in the general public, so much so that some see the seriousness of insider trading as "loosely analogous to jaywalking." SzoclcYJ, supra note 16, at 110-11.
237. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that the statutory language of Section 10(b) "must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction"); Karmel, Outsider Trading, supra note 41, at 108 (criticizing Rule 10b-5 as being "impermissibly vague for a criminal statute" and suggesting that the rule should be limited so that it applies to mere thieves); Painter et al., supra note 16, at 196-200 (describing the limitations of the Court's role in defining criminal conduct and the resulting ambiguities concerning the scope of culpability for insider trading); see also SzocKwj, supra note 16, at 108 (suggesting that the lack of a legislative definition of insider trading hampers the prosecution of insiders).
238. 
